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ABSTRACT 
A famous stylized fact in comparative politics, Duverger' s Law, is that electoral systems 
based on single ballot winner-take-all plurality voting will produce bipartisan competition. This 
paper presents an equilibrium model of elections in which this stylized fact emerges a logical 
implication of rational strategic voting behavior by individuals in a large heterogeneous electorate. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
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It is not just coincidence that Duverger's Law has established itself as one of the premier
empirical regularities in political science. With only minor caveats, 1 it is not only a stylized fact, but
also a well-documented fact2 that single member district electoral systems in which winners are
decided by simple plurality rule usually produce two-party systems. It is, as far as I know, the only 
such regularity in political science that is widely referred to as a "Law". 
What seems surprising, and what motivates this paper, is that in spite of the revolutionary 
ascent of formal modeling to the forefront of political theory methodology, this clear empirical 
regularity which has extremely intuitive informal explanations seems to have miraculously escaped 
the grips of an unambiguous mathematical theorem. If it is as true a Law as many seem to believe, 
then there should be a simple theoretical explanation for it which formalizes the informal stories and 
rationalizations which have been repeatedly offered for over a century. Hopefully this would also 
help identify and illuminate the rare circumstances in which departures from the most sweeping 
versions of the law might be expected. This paper offers such a model which explains Duverger's 
Law and indicates some unusual circumstances in which the law might not hold up. 
What do all the informal explanations have in common? We are fortunate that Riker (1982) 
has already collected many of these, so I will give only a few representative examples. One of the 
earliest is due to Droop ( 1869) who says that unpopular parties don't receive votes because voters 
don't want to waste their vote: 
"Each elector has practically a choice between two candidates or sets of candidates . . .  
(T)he electors usually find out that their votes will be thrown away, unless given in favor 
of one or other of the parties between whom the election really lies." 
This is a remarkable statement which is really a claim about equilibrium behavior of rational voters. 
It says that voters are making calculating decisions which weigh the chances of affecting the 
outcome given how other voters vote. It states that strategic voting is rational behavior, that voters 
are rational and do this, and that it results in a stable equilibrium configuration with only two parties. 
Thus voters are not only rational in his explanation, but they have rational expectations. His early 
conjecture about this type of strategic voting has been widely confirmed. 3
Earlier this century, Schattschneider (1942, p.82) stated: 
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"(P)eople who vote for minor opposition parties waste their votes (his emphasis). All 
who oppose the party in power are made to feel a certain need for concentrating their 
support behind the party most likely to lead a successful opposition. As a consequence, 
the tendency to support minor parties is checked. The tendency of the single-member 
district system to give the second major party a great advantage over all minor parties is 
extremely important. In this way it is possible to explain the longevity (his emphasis
again) of the major parties and the instability of the minor parties." 
These two explanations coincide almost exactly with what Duverger (1951, p. 226) himself called 
the "psychological factor" leading to two dominant parties: 
"In cases where there are three parties operating under the simple majority single-ballot
system the electors soon realize that their votes are wasted if they continue to give them 
to the third party: hence their natural tendency to transfer their vote to the less evil of its 
two adversaries in order to prevent the success of the greater evil." 
Duverger's psychological factor is then, quite simply, rational strategic voting. 
There have been two different formal theoretical approaches which have begun to address 
the question of what is the stable number of parties in a winner-take-all system. Both approaches 
are innovative and move a step beyond the standard Downsian models of electoral competition by 
opening up the possibility of multi-party equilibria. 
The first approach captures the aspect of multi-candidate competition for a single seat that is 
the focus of traditional explanations for Duverger's Law. With more than two candidates, voters 
have a significantly more difficult decision problem, since they may be better off voting for a 
candidate other than their first choice, if it appears that their first choice stands no realistic chance of 
victory. 4 This is the direction we pursue here. 
The first attempt to formalize this connection between Duverger's Law and rational voting 
behavior appears in Riker (1976). Ironically, a major point of that paper is to construct a theoretical 
model which can explain the India experience with persistent third parties, what Riker (1976, p.94) 
refers to (perhaps overenthusiastically) as "an egregious exception" to Duverger's Law.5 Cox (1987)
adopts a similar approach but embeds the strategic decision-making by voters into a probabilistic 
equilibrium model based on the theory of Bayesian games (Ledyard 1981, 1984). He shows that the 
only circumstances in which strategic voting might lead voters to abandon their most preferred 
candidate if their second most preferred candidate is expected to receive more votes. However, even
that is not a sufficient condition for strategic voting. He uses this result to show that there will at 
least be a marginal effect of strategic voting to help candidates who are expected to do well and to 
hurt candidates who are expected to do less well. 
This paper obtains a much stronger result. Using the same basic model of voter decision­
making as Ledyard (1981) and Cox (1987), we show that when the number of voters in the 
electorate is large, the equilibrium share of the "third party vote" must necessarily be small. 
Moreover, this equilibrium share of the vote declines to zero in the limit as the size of the electorate 
grows. This result is true under very general assumptions about the heterogeneity and distribution of 
voter preferences between the candidates, and the total number of candidates in the election, and 
possibilities for abstention. 
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The necessity of examining large electorates seems reasonable, if one interprets Duverger's
Law as describing a property of national electoral systems. In fact, Riker argues that a large 
electorate should be included as one of the conditions for plurality voting to have such a forceful 
impact on the party systems (1982, p.755). It is this paper's focus on the asymptotic properties of 
strategic voting that enables this stronger result to be obtained. 
The second of these approaches (Brams and Straffin (1982), Palfrey (1984)) is quite different 
and brings in dynamic, intertemporal factors by investigating whether two established parties will be 
able to adopt issue positions to preempt the successful entry of any third party. Palfrey (1984) shows 
in a simple one-dimensional spatial model that an equilibrium configuration of the two established 
parties in a winner-take-all system (when it exists) will have one leftist party and one party right of 
center, which are jointly situated so that no third party can enter the competition and win. The
intuition is that by positioning themselves neither too close together nor too extreme, the two
established parties are located so that there is no "room" for an entrant. Thus, given two established 
parties, additional parties are not viable. 6 The weakness of this approach is that is assumes no 
strategic voting. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the model of 
three-candidate elections, following the assumptions of Cox (1987). Section III proves the central 
result of the paper, that in equilibrium, the share of the vote for the third party declines to zero as the 
number of voters increases. Section IV explores the extent to which these results generalize when
candidates are free to select platfonns, as opposed to when the distribution of voter preferences over 
candidates is exogenously fixed. 
Il. THE MODEL
There are three candidates, A , B , C. There are n voters. Each voter has a (strict) preference
ranking over the three candidates and we represent a voter's preferences for each candidate by a
VonNeumann-Morgenstem utility number. These utilities are nonnalized so that voter i receives a
utility of 1 if his (or her) first choice wins, a utility of 0 for his least preferred candidate and a utility
of v; for his middle ranked candidate. The distribution of voter preferences is represented by
< qAB ' qACt qB A. qsc. qcA. qcB >and< F AB(-) FAc(-), FaA (·),Fae(·), FcA (-),FcsO>. 
Each q;i equals the probability a randomly selected voter ranks candidate i first and j
second, or alternatively, the average frequency of each possible preference ranking in the electorate. 
We assume each voter's preference is independently drawn from this distribution. A voter who 
ranks i first and j second is henceforth referred to as a ij-type. Below, we make two assumptions
about the distribution. That these assumptions are relatively innocuous is argued later in the paper. 
Asswnption 1: 
q;i >0 for all i , j =A,B ,C
In other words, we assume that every ranking of the candidates can occur (but, possibly, 
with very low frequency). Each F;i (·) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf ) of
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von Neumann-Morgenstern utility values of j (the second ranked candidate) for a randomly selected 
ij-type. A ij-type who values j at v will be called a ij-v-type.
Assumption 2: 
For all i , j , F;j (· ) is twice continuously differentiable,
F;j(O) = 0 
f;j(v) = F;j(v)>O for all ve[0,1]. 
Assumption 2 rules out mass points of voters and assumes that the probability that two 
randomly selected voters will have exactly the same ranking and exactly the same "intensity of 
preference" (v) is negligible. Fmally, we assume that each voter's preferences are independently
drawn from the probability distribution given 
p = < QAB , • • •  , QCB ' F AB , • • • , F CB >. 
Now that we have specified voter preferences, we can specify the voting game. Each voter 
simultaneously chooses one of the candidates to vote for, taking as given the voting strategies of 
other voters, in order to maximize the expected utility of the outcome of the election. Recall that 
since we are talking about election of a single candidate, ties will have to be broken if two (or all
three) candidates tie for the most votes received. How these ties are broken does not affect the 
results in section 3, so we will simply assume that ties are broken alphabetically (e.g. A beats B in a
tiebreaker). 
Each voter knows only his own preferences between A , B , and C and that the other voters
are independently distributed according to P . Therefore, a voter views the strategies of the other
voters as functions which specify what each other voter would do for every type he might be. We 
can represent such a strategy for one voter as a measurable function 
ct: {AB, AC, BA, BC, CA, CB} x [0,1]-+ {A,B, C}.
To simplify the proofs, we will only investigate properties of  "symmetric" equilibria. In 
other words, we will investigate stable behavior in which only two identical voters will make
identical voting decisions. This restriction enables us to suppress the i -index or r. Therefore, a
voter views the strategy of each other voter as the same function a. This symmetry assumption
could be dispensed with, but it would be at considerable cost in notation. 
The careful reader will have also noticed by now that we assume all voters vote. Thus, in
contrast to Ledyard (1981) or Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) we do not consider the possibility of
abstentions. 
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So far, we have accumulated a number of assumptions which potentially might restrict the 
scope of the theorem. Summarizing these are: 
(1) All preference types are possible.
(2) Distribution of preferences has no mass points. 
(3) Voter preferences are independent 
(4) No abstention. 
(5) Symmetric equilibrium.
We will discuss relaxing these assumptions later in the paper. 
Let DA. D8 and De, denote the set of voter types who vote for A , B, or C, respectively
under a. The probability a randomly selected other voter will vote for A , B , or C, is denoted
1tA, 1ts, or 1tc, respectively where 1tA + 1ts + 1tc = 1 and 1tj � OV j. Then 1tj is the probability that a
randomly selected voter other than i has a type in Di. For shorthand, we can denote a strategy
O' = (DA,Ds,De). 
Given (DA, D8• De) and (1tA, 1t8, 1tc ), voter i adopts a strategy, to maximize expected
utility. This strategy is characterized below for an AB-v-type voter. Optimal strategies against
(DA. D8 • De )-"best responses"-for other types of voters are similar.
Finally, we assume no one votes for the candidate ranked last in preference. Thus, an AB 
voter never votes for C, etc. This is quite reasonable, as a voter can never gain by doing so. A 
strategy which calls for voting for one's least preferred candidate would be a weakl.y dominated 
strategy. Ruling out weakly dominated strategies is usually considered reasonable, and the logic of 
doing so in the present context is compelling. 7 
The following lemma states that any equilibrium strategy must have the property that a voter 
will vote sincerely (i.e., for his top ranked candidate) for small values of v (i.e., if his second ranked 
and third ranked candidates both produce relatively low utility levels). A voter will only vote 
insincerely in equilibrium if v is relatively large (i.e., his second-ranked candidate is sufficiently 
close in utility to his top-ranked candidate). Furthermore, insincere voting requires that the 
likelihood of switching the outcome from one's worst candidate to one's second choice candidate by 
voting insincerely instead of sincerely exceeds the probability that insincere voting switches the 
outcome from one's most preferred candidate to one's least preferred candidate. 
Lemma}: 
If other voters use (DA, D8, De), generating probabilities (1tA, 1ts, 1tc ), and if i is a type
AB- voter, then i 's best response is: 
(i) Vote for A if: 
P 28 (1 - V) + P 2e > P2B V
(ii) Either vote for A or B if (i) holds with equality. 
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(iii) Vote for B if P2s v > p 2s (1 - v )  + p .Ze. 
where 
pis = probability that voting for A yields A ,  but voting for B yields B
p le = probability that voting for A yields A ,  but voting for B yields C
P2B = probability that voting for A yields C ,  but voting for B yields B .
These probabilities are computed using trinomial formulas, with parameters 1tA , 1ts , 1tc and n • 
They are derived below: 
p le = probability that out of (n -1) other voters , a vote for A ,  b vote for B , c vote for C and 
b < a  = c - 1
= probability{b < a  = c-1} 
= 
1!!..1-1 2� (n-1) ! ( )" ( )n-2"-2( ) " + 1� _ 1 k ! (k+l) ! (n-2k-2) !  1tA 1ts 1tc "= (-3-1 
where [X] is the least integer greater than or equal to X. Similarly, 
and 
P2s = probability {a < b = c-1}
= 
c!!..1-12� (n-1) ! ( )n-2"-2( ) " ( )" + 1� _ 1 k ! (k+l) ! (n-2k-2) !  1tA 1ts 1tc k = (-- 1 3 
p2IJ = probability {a = b ;?! c-1}
= 
+ probability{a = b-1;;:: c-1} 
[ n-11-i. (n-1) ! ( )" ( )" ( )n - 2" - 1�1 k ! k ! (n-2k-1) ! 1tA 1ts 1tc k = (-1-1 3 
+ 
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[n-11_12� (n-1)! ( )k ( )k + 1 ( )n -2k - 1� k ! (k+l)! (n-2k-1)! 1tA 1tB 1tc k.=[31-1 
Analogous fonnulas for the voters with other preference orders over candidates can also be 
derived. We say a is a Symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (or simply Equilibrium) if for every i,
a(t;) maximizes i 's expected utility when i is type t; and when all other voters use the strategy a. 
From Lemma 1, if either p;j or pfj is positive, we may rewrite the inequality in (i) as:
pA + Pllc n > IJ Vij - ---"---p!j +pfj (2) 
Consequently insincere voting not only requires v to be relatively large, but also requires that the 
voter is more likely to be pivotal between his second and last choices than between his first and last 
choices (pfj > pfl). Therefore, an equilibrium can be written as a set of six cut points, 
v; = (v2s, v2c, vGA, vGc, v�A, v�8) each of which must either equal 1 or satisfy (2) with equality. A 
cutpoint has a convenient and simple interpretation. A voter votes for his second choice if and only
if his intensity of preference for that second choice (v) is sufficiently high. Inequality (2) is a precise
statement of what "sufficiently high" means. For some ij-types, there is no v e (0, 1) that is
sufficiently high, in which case no voter with this order of preference for the candidates will vote 
strategically. This happens for an ij-type whenpfl > pfj .8
Lemma 1, then, specifies six inequality conditions that must hold at an equilibrium. 
However, this is only a partial description of an equilibrium. A further requirement of Bayesian
equilibrium is that 1tA , 1t8 and 1tc are in fact generated by the voters all adopting the decision rule
given by the equilibrium cutpoints. This is sometimes referred to as the "rational expectations0 
property of Bayesian equilibrium, because it means that if all voters share expectations that other 
voters vote for A , B and C with probabilities 1tA , n:8 , and 1tc , then the optimal behavior by voters,
given these expectations will produce the expected voting pattem-i.e. expectations (or beliefs) are 
self-fulfilling. This produces three additional equilibria conditions: 
1tA = qABFAB(vis) +qAcFAc(vic) +qBAC1-FBA(V8A)] +qcA [1-FcA (v�A)] (3A) 
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Possible equilibria: 
We distinguish between three possible types of equilibria, depending upon the configuration 
of voter strategies. These are called one-party equilibrium, two-party equilibrium, and three-party 
equilibrium, and are defined by the number of parties whose candidate receives a positive expected 
vote. The form of Duverger's Law that we intend to prove is that, within the confines of our model, 
only two-party equilibrium occur. 
Several observations can now be made about equilibrium with at least four voters. First, 
there will exist an equilibrium. In fact there exists at least three equilibria where in each of these 
equilibria there is substantial strategic voting, in the sense that some voters do not vote for their first 
choice. To see this, take any pair of parties, assume all voters vote for their preferred one of these 
two, and consider the implications of Lemma 1: A voter should vote for his first choice unless his 
first choice is not one of the two candidates receiving votes, in which case he should vote for his 
second choice. (This argument requires that the population of voters be at least four.) This is an 
equilibrium. 
Next, consider a possible on�party equilibrium in which the candidate of one of the parties 
receives all of the votes. Why is this not an equilibrium? The probability of casting a decisive vote 
is 0, so each voter is indifferent between voting for any candidate, since his vote cannot effect the
outcome (assuming the population of voters exceeds two). However, for a voter who ranks the 
unanimous winner last, voting for either other candidate is guaranteed to generate at least as high an 
expected utility as voting for the candidate who is expected to get all the votes, and, for some (out of 
equilibrium) configuration of strategies by other voters, generates strictly higher expected utility. 
Thus such equilibria rely on the use of dominated strategies. This eliminates the "unanimous" 
equilibria. 
To summarize, Lemma 1 and the assumption that voters do not use dominated strategies 
together immediately imply that: 
(1) There is no equilibrium in which only one party's candidate receives votes. 
(2) There are three two-party equilibria. 
We next tum to the central question of this paper: In large electorates, (as n � oo) will there ever
exist any three-party equilibrium? The answer is no, except for knife-edge cases.
IIl. STRATEGIC VOTING WITH MANY VOTERS
The objective of this section is to show that in large electorates with simple-plurality, 
singl�ballot elections there do not exist any equilibria in which all parties are viable. In particular, 
except for knife-edge cases, the only equilibria which can exist in large electorates involve exactly 
two parties with candidates who receive a positive fraction of the vote, if we assume voters do not
use dominated strategies (i.e., they never vote for their last choice). 
With three candidates and any number of voters, the critical element in the voter calculus is 
the probability of casting a decisive vote, and in particular, the relative probabilities of casting a 
decisive vote between one's first and last choices versus one's second and last choices. 
Consequently, the key aspect of "proving" Duverger's Law in large electorates involves identifying 
the asymptotic properties of these probabilities. The following lemma turns out to be very important 
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in establishing these properties: 
Proof: 
The proof consists of a messy formalization of the following intuitive argument. Without 
loss of generality, assume x8 S 1tc. Then P�c is the probability that the least popular candidate and
the "favorite" are tied for the most votes and P�B is the probability that the second most popular and 
the favorite are tied for the most votes. 9 Thus p le /p � 8 is equivalent to the ratio of likelihoods that
the least popular candidate is tied for victory with the favorite compared to the second most popular 
candidate being tied with the favorite, conditional on one of these two ties occurring. The lemma 
states that with many voters, if some candidate ties the favorite it will almost certainly have to be the
second most popular candidate. The implication of this is that if your personal favorite is the least 
popular candidate then, regardless of your relative valuation, v , of your second choice with enough 
voters in the electorate you will be better off voting for your second choice. 
Outline of Formal Proof (Details in Appendix): 
For each n, denote by E2c and E28 the expected winning share of the two candidates who
receive the most votes, conditional on A and C being tied for the most, or B and C being tied for the 
most, 10 respectively, and define EAc = lim Elc and Ecs = lim E28• The proof next proceeds
through a series of steps: 
Step 1: Prove that
1 Ecs=
----
1tA 
2+ -== V7ts7tc 
n-+oo n-+oo 
Step 2: 
Prove: 
Step 3: 
10 
Let 
-n (n -1)! ( )[EAC(n-1)
 [n-2-2E.u:Cn-1)] 
PAC = [(n-l)EAc ]! [1 + (n-l)EAc ]! [n-2-2EAc(n-1)]! 
1tA 1tc 1tc1tB 
-n PCB= 
(n-1)! 
[Ecs (n-1)  [n-2-2Ecs (n-1)][(n-l)EcB ]! [1 + (n-l)EcB ]! [n-2-2EcB (n-1)]! (xB 1tc) 1tc1tA 
-n 
lim ( P
AC) = 0-n n--.oo PCB 
-n 
lim( �
c
) = 0
n--.oo PCB 
These three steps are proved in the appendix and establish the lemma in case 1tc ;;:: 1tB • If 1ts ;;:: 1tc,
the entire proof goes through identically with the only change being that EAc = 11.3 for all values of
(1tA, 1ts ,  1tc ), such that 1ts ;;:: 1tc. 
Theorem: 
Fix F. There does not exist a sequence of equilibria { v;}:=l such that 
0 < 1t; < min{1t; � }, where 1tj = lim 1tj (v;) , j = A, B ,  C, where 1tj (vn*) is given by equation
n--.oo 
(3j). 
Proof: 
Without loss of generality, let 1t; = min{x; ,�} and hypothesize 0<1t; < 1t;. Then for
some profile, then there must exist some subsequence of {v;}, call it {v,:}, such that at least one of 
the following limits holds: 
lim 
*m • 1VBA a VBA < 
m�oo 
1. •m • 1llD VcA a VcA < 
m�oo 
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In other words, there must be some region with a positive measure of voters who vote for A in the
limit We will now apply Lemma 1 to prove that v .:a and v ..ic must equal 0 and v;A and v�A must
equal 1. From equation (2) , we have
m + m •m PAB PAC 
VAB = m m = 
PAB +Pca 
pXJJ!p& + PfclP& 
pXJJIP�B + 1 
(Note that for large m p& > 0, by the hypothesis that x; > 0 and � > 0.) If limits exist, then
• litn •m VAB = VAB = m�oo 
lim (pXJJ!p&) + lim (pfclp&) 
n�oo n�oo 
lim(pXJ,1pea> + 1 
From Lemma 1, each of the limits on the right hand side of the equation above exists and equals 0, 
so v1, = 0. By the same argument, v..ic = 0. That v1i = 1 follows simply from the observation
that if every voter who prefers A to B ( and C is last) will never vote for A , then no voter who
prefers B to A ( and C is last ) will ever vote for A . Similarly vcA = 1. Therefore, x..i = 0, a
contradiction. 
(Q.E.D.) 
An alternative statement of the proof is the following.
Theorem: Fix F and fix 1CA > x8 > 1tc > 0. Then there is an electorate size N such that for all
n � N and for all equilibria { v;} , (x..i (v;), x; (v;), �Cv:>) :1: (xA, 1t8 ,1tc; ) .
In other words, the least popular party's equilibrium share of the vote must converge to 0 as the
electorate becomes large, if all voters are acting strategically. 
Exceptional Cases: 
The above theorem does not completely rule out three-party equilibria since there is the 
possibility that 1CA =min { x8 , 1tc}. There are two cases to consider here. First, if x8 = 1tc, then we
must have 1CA = 1ta = 1tc = � . In this case, for large n, all voters vote for their first choice, since the
right hand side of inequality (2) converges to 1. This can be sustained as an equilibrium only if
qAB + qAc = qBA + q9c = qcA + qcB , a knife edge case.
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Second, if 1ta = 1tc , then 1tA = 1ta < 1tc. In this case, inspection of inequality (2) for large n 
shows that in equilibrium we must have all voters voting for their first choice, so such an equilibrium 
can occur in large electorates only if either qAB + qAc = qBA + qsc or qAB + qAc = qcA + qcs or 
qBA + qsc = qcA + qca. Again, these are exceptional cases. 
The exceptional cases have interesting interpretations. The first case, where 
1tA = 1ts = 1tc = � can occur in one of two ways. The obvious way it can occur is ruled out by 
assumption and might arise if all voters evaluate all candidates identically. While this may not seem 
to be a likely thing to happen from an empirical standpoint, and it may seem intuitively implausible, 
it certainly cannot be ruled out theoretically; in fact some recent versions of the Downsian model of 
candidate competition make such a theoretical prediction. We return to this in the next section. 
This case can also arise if the parties take positions so that voters are equally split in their 
preferences between the parties. While there maybe some rare historical instances where this has 
happened, such situations seem inherently unstable because of the delicate balance on which exactly 
equal three-way division hangs. 
The second exceptional case arises when there is one very popular party and two (or more) 
equally minor parties. Again I would argue that is relatively unlikely to happen, but here we do have 
a specific empirical case that seems to fit: India. The discussion in Riker (1976) and some of the 
references he cites support this theoretical explanation quite convincingly. The Congress party is 
clearly dominant relative to a collection of lesser parties, the strongest of which are roughly equal in 
strength. The lesser parties are of significant size and do not disappear, but are just too disparate to 
unify into a single, effective opposition party. 
IV. EXTENSIONS AND GENERALIZATIONS 
A. More than three possible parties 
The basic idea of the results in the last section was that if exactly three parties put up 
candidates for election when there are many voters, then equilibrium voting patterns will end up 
eliminating exactly one party in the sense that its candidate must receive an order of magnitude less 
votes than the runner-up. One (of several) artificial features of the model was that only three parties 
were considered. Suppose m > 3 parties competed. Then is it possible that perhaps more than 2 , say 
m 
- l, parties could be viable in equilibria? The answer is no. Two is unequivocally special in this 
regard. Suppose we wanted to see if the expected vote shares, 1tA � 1ta > 1tc > 1to > · · · > 0 in an 
m-party race could possibly be a limit point of equilibrium expected vote shares as the number of 
voters became large. As before, we find (by a similar argument) that the probability of a voter being 
decisive between A and B will become (in the limit) infinitely greater than the probability of a voter 
being decisive between A and any other pair. Thus, in the natural generalization of this model to 
plurality voting between candidates from m parties, Duverger's Law remains intact. 
It is probably instructive to sketch the proof. What has to be shown is that in large 
electorates, equilibrium voting behavior implies that a voter will always vote for the most preferred 
candidate of the two frontrunners. To see this, consider a voter with utility v 1 for his or her first 
choice, v2 for second, etc., up to Vm for his least-preferred candidate. That is v 1 � v2 � • • • � Vm. 
Let vk denote the utility of his first choice among the frontrunners (i.e. k equals either A or B) and 
13 
let v1 denote the utility of his second choice among the frontrunners, and assume vk > v1• 11 Let j be
any candidate other than k. We can write down a condition analogous to inequality (2) which
specifies when such a voter is better off voting for k then j. Using the same notation as before, we 
get for given n : 
[
:r, P
;
j ] [ l i ¢j pf;-plj V,t > V· + :r, V· 1 I.PA ; ¢i..t ' I.PA h ¢.k h ¢k 
This can be rewritten as: 
:r, 
(p�) i ¢j P.t1 
:r, (
p
� ) 
h ¢.k P.t1 
+ :r, v; 
i ¢j,k 
(pf; -plj) 
pfi 
The limiting argument now proceeds in the familiar fashion. Fixing 1t.t � 1t1 > ... > 0, we get
pl': _!L --+ 0, for all ij :1: kl. Thus, the right hand side of (2) converges to v1, independently of j.
pfi 
B. Spatial Party Competition 
(2') 
(2'') 
A natural question to ask is whether the model presented here is consistent with a spatial 
model of voter behavior. The answer is yes, but with a caveat If the voters are drawn from a
continuous distribution of "reasonable" (say, Euclidean) preferences and parties offer candidates at 
different points in the policy space then the results go through directly. If the parties generate
candidates over which all voters are indifferent the result will be false. Therefore, the caveat is that 
the theorem only applies to differentiated parties. 
Several remarks about this implicit assumption that three candidates do not converge are in 
order. First, even if parties do converge in policy space, the results will still go through as long as 
voters systematically misperceive the locations of the candidates, or if candidates have non-policy 
attributes which distinguish them (age, looks, voice quality, ethnic background, regional base, etc.). 
The failure of the result to hold at convergence of candidates is appropriately viewed as a knife-edge
case. 
Second, this knife edge feature suggests that the next step to take is to embed a game of 
party competition within the structure of the n-party voter equilibrium studied here. This would
generate a model somewhat like Ledyard (1984) with two important exceptions. First, we have three
candidates, not two. Second, Ledyard allows for abstention. While the abstentions are easy to 
incorporate, the complications generated by more than two candidates are subtle and difficult 
because of the inevitability of strategic voting. In Ledyard's (1984) model, 12 the fonnal structure is
a two stage game. The first stage of the game is a simultaneous choice of platfonns (or nomination 
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of candidates) by each party. In the second stage, the voters get to obseive {perfectly) these choices 
by candidates but have incomplete infonnation about the preferences of the other voters. Voters 
then choose simultaneously which candidate to vote for. The second stage subgames correspond 
exactly with the analysis in the body of this paper. However, as we pointed out earlier, there are 
multiple voter equilibria in any subgame. (i.e. for any location of the candidates). These multiple 
equilibria make the equilibrium behavior in the first stage of the game essentially indetenninate-i.e. 
there will be many candidate equilibria that can be supported by some configuration of voter 
equilibria in the subgames. (By "configuration" we mean a function which assigns party platfonns 
into equilibrium voting strategies). This indetenninacy needs to be investigated more thoroughly, 
but such an investigation is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. 
The spatial interpretation of the model presented in section Il also relates to Assumption l, 
that all preference orders have positive probability. In one dimension with single-peaked 
preferences, some preferences are impossible. Nonetheless, the theorem goes through even if qik = 0 
for some orderings. Similarly, with respect to the details of Assumption 2 , it is not necessary that 
the density function be positive for all v e [0,1]. The only important part of Assumption 2 is the 
requirement that there be no mass points. 
C. Abstention: 
Any model of voting which explores the implications of rational strategic behavior in large 
electorates is obliged to consider the implications of abstention. It is established by Palfrey and 
Rosenthal (1985) using a very similar Bayesian game approach that in large electorates rational 
voters with positive net costs of voting will not tum out This means, simply that we must restrict 
analysis to the portion of the electorate who have non-positive net costs of voting. There are many 
reasons why net costs many not be positive: consumption value from voting, feelings of citizen duty 
or obligation, fear of reprisals or sanctions for not voting (badgering by spouse, union official, 
friends, party activists), to name a few that are often suggested. In fact, as long as any strictly 
positive fraction of the electorate has non-positive net costs of voting, and therefore vote, all of the 
results of the paper hold. 
In an extreme case, if all voters were to have strictly positive net voting costs then the 
prediction would be that nearly 0% turnout would run with large elections. While this will 
undoubtedly change the theorems in this paper (I have not worked out the details), the implication of 
no turnout is wildly out of synch with the significant numbers we obseive voting. 
D. Dynamics: 
The results in this paper have been interpreted as implying that if three parties are competing 
in a single-ballot winner-take-all system, eventually (i.e. in an equilibrium) one of the parties will 
be weeded out. However, the model is static, even though the interpretation has dynamic overtones. 
A dynamic model would probably seive two very useful purposes here. First, the equilibrium 
expectations of voters, which drive their equilibrium voting decisions in multi-candidate elections 
do not emerge from thin air. These expectations are the product of past electoral outcomes, polls, 
media commentary, and other factors. Polls, past outcomes, etc. themselves are endogenously a 
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function of voters expectations and decisions. This suggests that it would make more sense from a 
standpoint of realism to explicitly model expectations and strategies as evolving over time. (For 
examples of this approach in dynamic economic models, see Marcet and Sargent (1985) and
Woodford (1986)). 
The second potential contribution of a dynamic model would be to lead toward a resolution 
of the indeterminacy of multiple equilibria in the static model. The static model in this paper went a 
long way in this regard, by essentially eliminating all equilibria in the voting game except for 
two-party equilibria However, there are still (at least three) multiple two-party voter equilibria, and
these in tum produce a plethora of equilibria in the larger game of party competition, as argued 
above. A well-formulated model of the dynamics of the formation of expectations and beliefs about 
when a party is a "viable" one (worth expending one's vote on) might shed some light on the 
indeterminacy issue. 
E. Other Electoral Systems 
The original statement of Duverger's Law actually has more pieces than the one examined 
here. In fact, Duverger asserts a partial converse (which he does not refer to as a "law") of the result 
proved here, that "the single-majority systems with second ballot and proportional representation 
favor multi-partisan." (p.239) This presents some new problems from a theoretical standpoint, as the · 
modeling of proportional representation systems is much harder, because of more of a need to 
explicitly study the coalition formation process. This is not to say that in simple majority 
single-ballot non-PR systems, the coalition formations process among legislators is inconsequential. 
In fact, this is an aspect of the problem we have glossed over in this paper. Usually a party runs a 
slate of candidates, often across a range of political. "districts" to produce a legislature as a 
concoction of regional winners. The representative system modelled in this paper consisted of but a 
single "at large" district with a single representative. 
Duverger claims that an additional (beside strategic voting) reinforcing feature in preventing 
more than two parties is the under-representation of small parties (share of seats much less than 
share of votes) that results as a consequence of single-ballot winner-take-all elections at the district 
level. Since this "mechanical" (Duverger p.226) factor would seem to reinforce the strategic voting 
factor analyzed in this paper, its absence from the model does not seem to detract significantly from 
the results. 
On the other hand, the entire notion of PR makes little sense at all in the context of electing 
a one-member govemmenL The fact that a party can win some seats with less than a majority only
makes sense if there are several seats up for grabs. Thus any model of PR will require a model of 
multi-member assemblies. This is a more difficult issue. There are many variations on PR and 
majority-based electoral systems, as well as completely different types of systems (approval voting, 
cumulative voting, etc.) for which the implications of strategic voting are not well-understood. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Step 1 of Lemma 2: 
This problem is equivalent to the following one. A total of n balls are drawn with
replacement from an um containing a large number of red balls, white balls and green balls which 
occur with frequencies 0 <p 1 <p2 �p3, respectively. LetX,,13 denote the random variable taking on
values between � and � equal to the proportion of red balls conditional on exactly k red balls being
drawn, exactly (k+l) green balls being drawn, and exactly (n-2k-2) white balls being drawn and 
[!!.] - 1 2 . 
k� ; . ThenEf3 = ! l: kfi t3", wherep t:f = prob(X,,13 = kin). Think of the red balls as
k =i [ n-1 ] 3 
being votes for A , the green balls as being votes for C and the white balls as being votes for B. 
Standard results in probability theory tell us that the distribution of xp is asymptotically
nonnal. Therefore, since in our problem p t:r is unimodal ink for each n and that mode converges
to a limit, then the limit of the modes must equal E 13 . 
The limit of the modes is simple to compute because xp has a distribution similar to a
binomial. In particular, 
where 
Pn -kn p 13 = [!!.]-1 
jn 
P13 
2 jn L P13
. [n-1 ]1= 3 
= (n-1)! 
j n-2j-2-j+l 
j!( j+l)!(n-2j-2)! Pl P2 P3 '
n-1 n j = [-3-], ... ,[2] -l
Therefore, p f3 is unimodal in k if and only if p f1 is unimodal in k. To see that p f1 is unimodal
look at first differences, L\p� = p� -pf31". This gives
Jl. kn = [ (n -2k)(n -2k -1) [ PI P3] -l] (n -1)! k- 1 n -2k 1c P13 k(k + l) p£ (k -l)!k!(n -2k)! P1 P2 
p3
So L\pfl > 0 if
PlP3 k(k+l) 
-- > ------ ----
(pi)2 (n-2k)(n-2k-l}
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Rewriting this expression using the notation of the lemma, we getpft is increasing if 
1tA 1tc k (k + 1) 
�� > �-__...; ____  _ 
(1ts )2 (n - 2k) (n - 2k -1) 
The right hand side is strictly increasing in k, sop� is unimodal in k, as desired. If the mode is 
interior to (11.3, Y2), then for large n, it occurs at k which approximates 
1CA1tc k2 --= 
1CJ (n-2k)2 
or 
1tA 1tc (kln)2 --= 
1CJ [ 1-2(k ln )]2 
Solving, gives 
k - = 
n 
if 1tl < 1CA 1tc. 
1 
2 + 1ts 1°'11tA 1tc 
Since kin is constrained to be at least Y.J, we must have 
k - = 11.J n 
for 1tl > 1CA 1tc . Consequently, we get 
[ 
11.J if 1t/ > 1tA 1tc 
EAc = 1 "f 2 
2 + 1CB J:\J1CA 1tc 
1 1ts < 1CA 1tc 
An identical argument proves that Ec8 = 
(Recall 1CA < 1t8 s 1tc .) 
Proof of Step 2 of Lemma 2: 
Let 
= n 
_
 
(n-1)! ( )[(n-l)EAC] n-2-2[(n-
l)E"c1 
P CB - 1CB 1tc 1tc1tA [ (n-l)EAc ]! (1 + [ (n-l)EAc ])! (n-2-2[ (n-I)EAc]) ! 
Then 
-n [ ] 1+3£E...c(n -1) -(n -1) PAC 7tA 
P2B 
= 
7ta 
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which, for large n is bounded above by 1. By construction, p 2a < P�B , and it is easy to show that
=n P CB --=;;- converges to 0, so :
PCB 
-n -n = n litn ��C = litn ( �
AC )(P_�B ) = Q
n-+00 PCB n-+oo P �B PCB 
Proof of Step 3 of Lemma 2: 
The central limit theorem insures that for any e > 0, pjc(e) and P�B (e) converge to Pie and
P�B in the sense that lim (pjc(e)lpic) = 1, and 
litn (p�B(e)IP2B) = l, where
n-+oo n-+oo 
min{ n�l ,[(n -l)(EAC +£)]} 
n ( ) � (n-1) ! 7t� 7t�-2k-2 ""!+1 PAC e =
n-1 
� k !(k+1) !(2n-2k-2) ! n D 
· � 
max{-3-.((n -l) (E,u: -£)]} 
min{ n�l ,[(n - l)(Ecs +£)]} 
n ( ) _ � (n- 1) ! 2n- 2k-2 k k+1 PCB e 
-
n-1 
� k !(k+l) !(n-2k-2) ! 7tA 7tB 1tC 
k
= max{-3-.((n - lHEcs -£)
]}
Since EAc and Ec8 are both strictly less than 1h, we may choose £ so that
( n; 1 ) - [(n -l)(EAc + e)] and ( 
n
; 
1 ) - [(n - 1) (Ec8 + e)] both diverge to 00 in the limit.
Since EcB is strictly greater than 1h, e can also be chosen so that [(n - 1) (Ec8 - e)] -
n; 1 
diverges to 00 in the limit. Therefore, we may rewrite Pie(£) andp2B(£), for n sufficiently large and
£ sufficiently small as: 
where 
[(n - l)(EAc +£)] ( l) I n (£) - � n- . ( k n-2k-2 k+13 ) PAC - � k !(k+l) !(n-2k-2) ! 7tA 7tB 1tC k k=[(n -1) fPAc -£)] 
[(n - lHEcs +£)] (n l) I n ( ) _ � 
-
• ( n-2k- 2 le k+ l)PCB £ - � k 1(k+l) l(n-2k-2) 1 
7tA 7tB 1tC 
k=[(n -1) <Ecs -£)] • • • 
n-1 sk = o if k < --3 
= 1 if k ;;? n- l
3 
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For each n both of these sums contain equal numbers of terms which can be matched up. For given 
n, call the terms on the right hand side of the p,3c(e) equation a 1, 
• •
• , a,,,_ and the terms on the right
hand side of the P�B (e) equation b 1, • • •  , b,,,_. By construction, we have litn :: = 0 uniformly in l.
We also have 
lim P
ie (e)
n�oo P�B (e) 
a1 +··· +a 
I. m,. = 1m ----­n�oo b1 + • • • +b,,,_ 
a 1 + · · · a l l p .le (e) but b b
""' 
S max b
a
l 
. Since b
a
l 
� 0 unifonnly, we get litn = 0 . Therefore1 + · · · ,,,_ I Sm,. n�oo P�B (e)
lim Pie = O.
n�oop�B 
* 
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1. The most well-known exception is Canada, where provincial party systems are bipartisan, but
not all provinces have the same two dominant parties. This produces a patchworlc national
party system which is a conglomeration of strong regional parties, but in which there are still
two dominant national parties. The only contradiction to the Law here is that the minor parties
do not completely disappear. Apparently, and not surprisingly, parties which have heavily
concentrated local support can compete for national office in their regions. It is very important
to note however, that within those regions the local party systems tend to be bipartisan.
Furthennore, only the two major parties (the Tories and the Liberals) have controlled the
national government A second exception is India (see Weiner (1957)) where there is only one
dominant party, but third parties seem to be able to survive. Riker (1976) argues that this can
happen when historical circumstances produce a consensus party which is centrally located on
the political spectrum and has wide popular appeal: the Congress Party of India.
2. See Rae (1971) and many of the references in Riker's (1982) excellent suivey of Duverger's
Law.
3. See, for example Cain (1978) Duverger (1950) Bensel and Sanders (1979) Spafford (1972) and
others.
4. In fact, this is not only true for single-member district simple-plurality rule systems, but for
most other multi-candidate rules as well. Cumulative voting, proportional representation, the
Borda count, the Hare system and virtually any other method have this difficulty. For a general
statement about the widespread problems of eliciting "sincere" behavior, see Gibbard (1973).
5. As we will show later on in the paper, this "egregious exception" is in fact a theoretically
predicted exceptional case: the proverbial exception that proves the rule.
6. A related model is analyzed by Greenberg and Shepsle (1987). They define an axiomatic notion
of stability which is somewhat different from the noncooperative game-theoretic equilibrium
used in Palfrey (1984), but which retains the basic idea that established parties are situated in a
way that deters entry of new parties. However, they apply their stability notion to election
systems with multiple member districts, not winner-take-all systems.
7. Exceptions to the "reasonableness" of eliminating dominated strategies seem to arise in
prisoners' dilemmas and related games where there are clear group gains to coordinating
behavior. That is, everyone benefits when everyone adopts a dominated strategy. Such gains
are not present in the voting game considered here. For further discussion of the
appropriateness of eliminating dominant strategies see Palfrey and Srivastava (1986).
8. Cox (1987) has pointed out that one case where this happens is when 1t; > 1tj.
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9. Actually, because of the tie breaking rule, Plc equals the probability that, with n - 1  voters, C 
receives the most votes and A receives one less vote than C; Pc8 equals the probability that C 
receives the most votes and B receives one less than C; p b equals the probability A and B tie 
for the most or B gets one more vote than A . 
10. See footnote 9. 
11. By assumption, V.t > v1 for all except a measure zero set of voters. 
12. This is also the case in other models in which candidates and noncandidates are both treated as 
strategic actors (see, for example Austen-Smith (1987) and Ingbennan (1986), in the context of 
campaign financing.) 
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